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1.
Peter Hempel’s generosity of spirit and sympathetic warmth are, of
course, legendary. Let me add to the many examples others have
related of how his life so deeply and positively affected their own
by telling of my first meeting with him.
In the middle of my first semester as a graduate student in the-
oretical physics at Princeton the growing awareness that I was not
cut out for the life of a researcher into relativistic quantum field
theory flashed into brilliant illumination: I needed out – and quickly!
I crossed the short distance from Palmer Laboratory to McCosh
Hall where Peter’s office was located and called on him to ask if
there was any possibility whatever that I might be considered for
transfer into the philosophy program – despite the facts that I had
little formal training at all in philosophy and had made no formal
application to the program. At best I expected some advice on how
to start the procedures rolling so that I could apply for such a change
of program, and, perhaps, some encouragement that there might
be some possibility that I would be successful in my application.
Needless to say it was with utter astonishment that I listened to
his response to my sad tale of failure as a physicist and desire to
change my field of studies: Of course, he said, I was welcome to
the philosophy program. But didn’t I want to sit in on a few sem-
inars first to make sure that this was a change I really wanted to
make!
The warmth of this initial welcome into the philosophy program
was matched by the continuing support and encouragement that
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followed. Peter’s deep and abiding concern for the welfare and the
development of his students was always accompanied by his pro-
found intellectual openness of mind and his genuine enthusiasm
for the work of those around him, even when that work went off
in directions very different from those marked out by his own so
important work in scientific method. I have been fortunate to have
come to know many in the profession of philosophy over the years
who have combined deep philosophical research with fine teaching
abilities and with true decency as human beings. But I have never
met another Hempel.
2.
Two of Hempel’s justifiably renowned contributions to the meth-
odological philosophy of science are his detailed explication of
explanation by subsumption of correlated events under generali-
ties, the deductive-nomological model expounded in his famous
paper jointly authored with Paul Oppenheim, and his important
exploration of the notion of confirmation by instantiating instance.
Both contributions are replete with important insights. The care-
ful outline of the notion of explaining events by showing them to
be expectable conditional on the occurrence of other events given
empirically established lawlike regularities placed this Humean idea
in a modern context. It carefully delineated the formal and empir-
ical requirements for an argument form to constitute a legitimate
such subsumption having explanatory weight. It emphasized the
place of explanation in a general framework of the scientific search
for prediction and control. And it uncovered a number of hidden
puzzles latent in the intuitive notions. By laying out this empiricist
account of explanation with such care and precision, Hempel also
provided the challenge against which all of those who found expla-
nation as subsumption under generality not explanation enough had
to contend.
The analysis of instantial confirmation once again took a highly
intuitive idea, that hypotheses are confirmed by their positive par-
ticular instances, but carried the analysis of that idea to new levels
of sophistication and insight. Starting from Nicod’s naive idea of a
generalized simple conditional being confirmed when protasis and
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hypotasis each were positively instanced by the same element (All
A’s are B’s confirmed by something that is both an A and a B),
Hempel showed how one could seek for a notion of confirmation by
positive instance that was far more generally applicable. The most
striking feature of the development was Hempel’s brilliant discus-
sion of the intuitive criteria of adequacy that one would want the
ultimate formal definition to satisfy. Showing how a consequence
condition and a converse consequence condition together led to a
degeneration of the notion of indirect confirmation into triviality
opened a realm of puzzles for those enamored of a hypothetico-
deductive model of the confirmation of theories. And showing how
as apparently innocuous a condition as that logically equivalent
hypotheses ought to be equally confirmed by one and the same
piece of instantial data led to the notorious “Paradox of the Ravens”
and opened up new problem areas for research all on its own.
In particular Hempel’s analysis forced careful attention on such
issues as the relationship of a purely qualitative notion of instantial
confirmation to quantitative notions of confirmation, and it forced
attention on the issue of the many factors to which confirmation
of hypothesis by data may be argued to be relativised (such as
background knowledge and the set of alternative hypotheses under
consideration).
3.
One noteworthy feature of both the model of explanation and the
model of confirmation Hempel constructed is their abstractness.
They are constructed using a very sparse set of concepts and they
are to be applicable in any context whatever. Nothing in the way of
our scientifically developed understanding of the actual fundamental
features of the physical world is invoked in describing the structure
of what it is to be an example of an explanation or an example of a
confirmation. And no restraints are placed on the domain in which
the concepts can be applied. All explanations, in physical theories,
in psychology, in the social sciences, are to be taken as subsump-
tions of correlated events under generalities, and nothing more is
required of an argument form for it to constitute an explanation
than that it has the appropriate logical form and that the explain-
24 LAWRENCE SKLAR
ing assertions are properly non-trivial. And all confirmations, in
any domain of experience, are to be thought of as either direct, in
having the predicates of an hypothesis instantiated by particulars
in the right way in some evidential situation, or as indirect, medi-
ated by the logical relation of hypothesis to some already confirmed
hypotheses.
There are, I suspect, many reasons why Hempel strove for such
abstractness in his accounts of both explanation and confirmation.
Let us focus on the model of explanation and seek some of these
out.
There is, of course, the direct ancestry of the deductive-
nomological model in Hume’s account of causation. To explain is
to give causes, or at least so the discourse went at least as far back
as Aristotle. But if causes are nothing but events spatially and tem-
porally contiguous to the event caused and linked to it in the world
by constant conjunction and in the mind by the imagination which
induces the leap from the idea of the cause to that of the effect, then
when we ask for the explanation of an event in the world, surely all
we can be asking for is the linkage between that event and others
to which it is related by the fact that the mutual occurrence of the
events forms a general regularity in the world.
Now, of course, one thing Hume was out to do was to get any
idea of “necessary connection” between cause and effect out of the
world and into, at best, psychological propensities to believe. But, I
believe, even by the time of Hume there was something else going
on that was tending to push the philosopher into offering an account
of causation and explanation that was so highly abstract. And this
requires looking not just at the history of philosophy but at the
history of science as well.
Already by Hume’s time physics had suffered at least two
“methodological shocks” concerning explanation. By this I mean
that transformations of the theoretical understanding of what the
world was like had resulted in profound transformations in the very
idea of what it would be to offer an explanatory account of the nature
of the world. The notion of what sort of thing science ought to be
providing us when it provides us with explanations could be over-
thrown when a major theory that provided explanations of a kind
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earlier accepted as being the right sort of thing, the sort of thing
explanations ought to be, was superseded.
With the rise of Copernicanism came the need for a new dynam-
ical theory compatible with its postulation of a rapidly spinning
earth. Galileo, building on the impetus theorists, first offers a kind
of inertia taking natural, unforced motion of things on the earth to
be the sharing of its circular motion. Descartes realizes that it is,
rather, motion at constant speed in any straight line that is natural
and unforced. But Descartes and his fellow new physicists invoke,
along with their anti-Aristotelian theory of inertia, an altogether
anti-Aristotelian theory of what it is to explain the phenomena of
motion. Aristotelian notions of potentialities and powers, of natural
places in the universe, and of final causes are all to be discarded
on the rubbish heap of outworn metaphysics. Instead all is mass
and extension. All motion is relative motion of one body with
respect to some other, and all causation is causation by contact
and displacement. A theory of the motion of the heavens, with the
heavenly bodies carried along by the fluid plenum in which they
are all immersed, is accompanied by a general rejection as non-
explanatory of anything that fails to explain by positing motion
of one body transmitted directly to a body with which it is in
contact.
The brevity of the sway of the Cartesian model of explanation
was truly astonishing. It was only a few years before Newton had
demolished the entire Cartesian astronomical edifice. In the New-
tonian scheme, the heavenly bodies move in empty space, and the
forces that move them are due to almost Aristotelian powers of
bodies that can act at a distance. Motion is not merely relative
motion of one body with respect to another, but, instead, absolute
motion with respect to “place itself”. Time also is absolute, in that
the accuracy of clocks is to be judged not relative to one another, but
to the flow of time itself.
There are very curious aspects to the new scheme proposed
by Newton to replace the Cartesian picture. Although Newton is
chastised by the Cartesians for what positivists might call “meta-
physical” elements – his postulation of absolute space and his
tolerance of intrinsic causal powers – he is, at the same time, a
proponent of the kind of thinned down explanation as subsump-
26 LAWRENCE SKLAR
tion under correlation that appeals to the empiricist temperament.
For in response to the Cartesian accusation that he has failed to
explain the action of gravity he replies, famously, “Hypotheses non
fingo”, and comes close to maintaining that to give the correct
law under which the observable phenomena fall is to do explain-
ing enough. There is also a positivist tinge to Newton’s views
on confirmation. Well aware of the dangers of “inference to the
best explanation”, or the hypothetico-deductive model, he claims,
dubiously to be sure, to have arrived at his generalities by induc-
tion from the phenomena alone. (Thereby, perhaps, serving as one
of the inspiration for Hume’s skeptical attack on induction as no
better off than the method of hypothesis at assuring reasonable
belief.)
What is important to note here is that the Cartesians are not just
proposing a physical theory incompatible with Aristotelianism. And
Newton is not just proposing a physical theory incompatible with
Cartesianism. In both cases the very idea of what it is for a theory to
offer an explanation of the phenomena is up for question.
A second scientific debate carrying with it a debate over the
proper methodology of science and the proper notion of what it
is to be an explanation took place in the nineteenth century. This
controversy, and its putative resolution, was probably the most direct
historical influence on the deductive-nomological model. The con-
flict was the debate between “mechanicians” and “energeticists”. It
is a curiosity that in this debate Newtonian ways of explaining things
were often referred to as “mechanical”, given that in the earlier
dispute with the Cartesians it was Newton who opposed the then-
styled “mechanistic” account of the world in terms of transmission
of motion by contact alone.
In the nineteenth century the two disciplines of the theory of heat,
thermodynamics, and the theory of electricity and magnetism, elec-
trodynamics, came into their fruition. Why did the laws of heat hold
and why did the laws of electromagnetism hold? For the energeticist
asking such questions could amount to nothing more than finding
the most general and simple principles from which the laws of the
respective disciplines could be systematically derived. The First and
Second Laws of Thermodynamics and the unified Maxwellian laws
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of electromagnetism were all that one could ask of an explanatory
theory of heat or of electromagnetism.
For the disciple of mechanism, however, one could ask
much more. One could ask for the underlying mechanisms that
“explained” why the phenomenological laws held. In the case of the
theory of heat, this led to kinetic theory and ultimately to statistical
mechanics, in which the macroscopic thermal behavior of things
was accounted for in terms of the mechanical interactions of its
microscopic components supplemented by important probabilistic
posits over initial conditions. For electromagnetism it led to the
attempts at finding mechanical models of the aether, in order to con-
struct a mechanism that could support electromagnetic waves with
their well known fundamental features (such as polarization that
implied strict transversality to the wave magnitude). The mechan-
ical theory of heat, of course, became our orthodox theory, whereas
the mechanical theory of electromagnetism remains as nothing more
than an historical curiosity.
But it was, I think, the failure of mechanism in the case of elec-
tromagnetism, rather than the success of mechanism in the theory of
heat, that influenced methodology the most. Despite the overwhelm-
ing success of the atomic theory of matter, and the hypothesizing of
deeper and deeper “hidden” levels of being to explain what happens
at the level of the observable, it was the positivism of Mach and
Duhem that emerged victorious in the battle of the methodologists.
The orthodox doctrine became that which eschewed “hypotheses”,
meaning the real postulation of domains of unobservable things and
properties as explanatory of the observable, except insofar as the
hypotheses could be reconstrued as convenient “economical” sum-
maries of the regularities among the observables. And the orthodox
doctrine of explanation became the neo-Humean account in which
to explain could mean only to subsume the welter of phenomena
under generalizations that expressed constant correlations.
The refusal to countenance notions of “cause”, despite labeling
the particular conditions of the explanans by “c’s”, was motivated
not simply by Humean skeptical attacks on alleged early notions of
causation, but by claims to the effect that in the new physics all that
ever appeared were lawlike generalizations associating phenomenon
to phenomenon, and that the notion of the cause of a happening,
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carrying with it as it did much outworn metaphysics and many inap-
plicable “common sense” ways of accounting for the world, never
appeared in any role in this new physics at all.
4.
No sooner had the deductive-nomological model appeared than
the attacks on its adequacy began. Some of these argued that
the model demanded too much of an explanation. Hempel and
Oppenheim had, of course, always acknowledged that a class of
probabilistic or statistical explanations existed that could not fit into
the deductive-nomological model. Other, however, challenged the
need for generality of any kind in an explanation at all. Where,
they asked, were the generalizations in historical explanations?
Some argued for the appearance of generalization like compo-
nents in some explanans, but generalizations that were not, as
those demanded by the deductive-nomological model had to be,
empirically supported. There were, it was claimed, rational action
explanations where the invoked generalizations were grounded not
in induction or empirical generalization but in rational means-ends
calculations. Then there were those who pointed out the pragma-
tically determined contexts in which explanations were demanded
and supplied, and argued that these required that relevance consider-
ations be added to the other demands of the deductive-nomological
model.
Possibly the most persuasive objections to the deductive-
nomological model as a full characterization of explanation in
science, though, are those that criticize the model for allegedly
leaving out of the picture essential components required of an
scientific explanation. The criticism starts with the familiar counter-
examples to the analysis, propositions arranged in the models
premise-conclusion form and satisfying its other constraints such as
essentially invoking at least one empirical generalization, but where
we instinctively feel that such an argument form hardly counts as an
explanation. There is the problem of the model apparently alleging
that the length of the shadow explains the length of the flagpole.
There are surface generalizations that seem to express “mere” cor-
relations that hardly seem explanatory. And there are the cases
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where explanans and explanandum event are in the “wrong” time
order.
What is the deductive-nomological model missing out on when
it declares such argument forms explanations but we don’t find
them such? The natural response is that the model fails to realize
the importance of “causality” and “mechanism” in explanations.
Finding mere correlations, subsuming events under generalities no
matter how bold and how well empirically established, isn’t finding
explanations, it is sometimes said. To explain an event is to reveal
its causes. To explain a process is to unveil the hidden mechanisms
underlying its regular behavior. Such debates about the necessary
components of an explanation outrun the abstract concerns of the
philosopher, of course. Witness the continual courtroom battles as
lawyers deny that epidemiology is enough to establish causality
and that it is causality that the law requires for responsibility.
Without causation, without mechanism, they say, we have no
explanation for what has happened, and it is explanation that the law
demands.
5.
But how are we to deal with the repeated claims that models of
explanation that invoke mere subsumption of events under gen-
erality leave out the crucial causal and mechanistic aspects of
explanation? One thing we can do is to look for some understand-
ing of the notion of causation that is almost as abstracted from the
specific contents of our actual scientific beliefs as is the deductive-
nomological model. We can, for example, explore our intuitions
about how causal judgments on our part are intimately related to
our judgments about what would have happened or not happened
had some condition in the world been other than it was. That is
we can pursue the relationship of causation to counter-factuals. And
we can go on from there invoking possible worlds, their relations
of proximity and similarity, and all the familiar apparatus of the
metaphysics of causal modalities.
But when we have done all that will we still be, in the end,
mystified by what our intuitions about causation and mechanism
are grounded on other than our understanding that, in the abstract,
30 LAWRENCE SKLAR
there is regularity to the world and the gaining of knowledge of this
regularity is essential for our gaining of predictive and controlling
powers. That is, what is at base pushing us to insist that there is more
to causation and mechanism than mere regular order?
The abstract nature of the deductive-nomological model is, as
noted, in part a result of the historical drive to eliminate any pre-
conception dependent upon the maintaining of particular scientific
views from our model of the method of science itself. Too often
we found ourselves wedded to a model of what it is to do proper
science that was constricted by the specific nature of the science
of the time. Consider the Cartesian reluctance to accept Newton’s
dynamics and theory of gravity as really explanatory of the motion
of the planets, or the nineteenth century atomist-mechanist’s refusal
to allow that thermodynamics and electromagnetic theory might be
in no need of a mechanical underpinning in order to explain our
world to us. But can we really so neatly distinguish the “pure”
methods of science from the specifics of what is contained in our
accepted fundamental physical theories? Can we eliminate from our
models of methodology the specific nature of the world present
to us pre-theoretically that these fundamental scientific theories
describe?
The constant demand for “showing the mechanism” in explana-
tions can, perhaps, be understood in terms of intuitions on our part
about what an explanation needs to be, intuitions that are deeply
rooted in either our familiar experience of what kinds of regularities
we ordinarily encounter, or in what kinds of specific fundamental
theories seem so deeply embedded in our science that we can
hardly imagine them eliminated in any future scientific change. As
an example of the former, consider the Cartesian demand that all
explanation of change of motion must be grounded in contact force
and displacement of one object by another. Surely this is an intuition
about explanation that comes from the pervasiveness of our every-
day experience about how things do get put into motion in our usual
world (assuming, that is, that we don’t play with magnets all that
often!). As an example of the latter, consider the nineteenth century
mechanicians, living in a world of science that for two-hundred
years had been so dominated by Newtonian notions of masses
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and forces acting upon them and of the interactions of matter in
motion.
Perhaps the clearest context in which the role played by the spe-
cific constitution of nature as we encounter it in experience, and the
role played by our theoretical understanding of the origin of that
specific aspect of the way nature is, in the generation of our very
understanding of what it is to give an explanation of a phenomenon,
can be found in exploring the origin of our idea that in causal
explanations that which explains precedes in time that which is to
be explained. The simplest objections to the deductive-nomological
model that allege its failure to take causation into account are those
constructed by looking at two events that are lawlike conjoined and
arguing that while one explains the other, the explanation in the
reverse order is blocked by the asymmetry in temporal order of
the events. Past explains present and future, future cannot explain
present or past, but the deductive-nomological model allows for no
such asymmetry (even though that asymmetry was just plugged in
by its Humean ancestor).
We don’t really know where our idea of a time asymmetry in
explanation comes from. Perhaps it is epistemic in origin, related to
the fact that records and memories exist of past but not of future.
But, perhaps, that asymmetry as well as the explanatory asymmetry
have their origin in some actual asymmetry in time encountered in
experience and accounted for in fundamental physics. Perhaps, the
argument often goes, it is the asymmetries in time described by ther-
modynamics and other related “dissipations of order into disorder
into the future” that underlie the intuition that explanations go from
past to future.
Here we need not explore the differing details of accounts that
move in this direction, say those of Reichenbach resting on prin-
ciples of common cause or those of Lewis that seek for asymmetries
in our evaluations of the truth of forward- and back-tracking coun-
terfactuals. What matters here is that we have claims that, were they
true, would cast some doubt on the very idea that a methodological
program, such as analyzing the nature of explanation in science, can
be carried out in total abstraction from, and studied indifference to,
the specific actual general aspects of the world in which we live
and the specific structures of the theoretical accounts we can con-
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struct to deal with that world. If such a fundamental intuition of ours
about explanations, that is that they should be causal and that being
causal implies explaining later happenings by reference to earlier
ones, rests upon “contingent” features of the world of our everyday
experience that are to be accounted for in terms of the specifics of
our foundational physical theories, then there is good reason to think
of methodology as inextricably entangled with the ongoing program
of trying to understand the most fundamental structural features of
our world within science itself.
All of this being said, there does seem to be something special
about the core idea of the deductive-nomological model, that is that
explanation is subsumption under generality. One wonders if there
is some “contingent” feature of the world that itself grounds our
very most basic idea that to explain is to subsume under regularities.
What could a world be like in which our notion of explanation didn’t
have that as at least a fundamental component? Would there be any
place in such a world for anything like what we call explanation at
all?
6.
An examination of Hempel’s notion of instantial confirmation may
lead to similar observations about the inextricability of methodo-
logy and empirically contentful foundational science. Here at least
one route to this conclusion comes from the repeated realization,
at least since Whewell, that we have difficulty in making sense of
any confirmational notions without presupposing a privileged group
of substantive and attributive properties as characterizing things and
events in the world.
Over and over again we have been taught that it is hard to give
any formalization of some notion of confirmation that doesn’t take
as a given a specified set of designated classificatory categories.
Arguments to this effect can be seen in Whewell’s critique of
Mill’s methods, in Bertrand’s “paradoxes” for attributing probability
and their later incarnation in the “linguistic relativity” of Carnap’s
logical probability, in Goodman’s justly famous critique of “the
future will be like the past”, and, perhaps, in a transmuted form,
even in Wittgenstein on rule following.
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The bulk of the critical discussion of Hempel’s qualitative instan-
tial confirmation did not focus on such issues, but, rather, on
discussions of the criteria of adequacy, in particular on how to recon-
cile hypothetico-deductive reasoning with the obviously disastrous
consequences of adopting a general converse consequence condi-
tion, and on finding a way out of the “Paradox of the Ravens”. But
the problem of “appropriate kinds” is latent in Hempel’s analysis as
well.
Where do our preferred predicates come from? Goodman sug-
gests entrenchment, but other realists suggest: From our best avail-
able scientific theories. It is these theories themselves that tell us
when it is, and when it isn’t, reasonable to apply our inductive
methods, whatever they may be, to things classified in one way or
another. If this is right, then we may have here another demonstra-
tion of the inextricability of methodology from the task of finding
within science itself the appropriate framework for describing the
world.
7.
The desire on the part of logical empiricists and logical positivists
to frame methodology solely in terms of abstract logic, and to char-
acterize it as above the fray of the specifics of current science –
even foundational science – had its deep motivation. All too often
they had seen methodology limited by the presupposition that the
science of the day limited the range of any possible science. If Aris-
totelian, Cartesian or Newtonian science made claims to universality
as a foundational science, it was all too tempting to think that the
way that accepted foundational science explained constituted what
explanation had to be in general.
But the continual revolutions of science, with new disciplines
being created that bore little conceptual overlap with the old, and
with the repeated overthrow of the old even in its preferred domains,
put great pressure on methodologists to frame notions of explanation
and confirmation that would be independent of the presuppositions
of the specific science of the day, even the specific most general and
foundational science of the day.
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All of this lies, I think, in the background of such abstract char-
acterizations of explanation as the deductive-nomological model
and the instantial notion of qualitative confirmation developed by
Hempel. I don’t think we yet really understand the place of such
abstract methodology in our overall picture of the world. Can
method be so disassociated from the specific content of the theories
that, allegedly, are framed within the method in question? Or do
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